A Proposal for Mixed Financing of the Electoral and Party System in Mexico

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to offer a proposal for a mixed-financing political reform in electoral and party matters for the Mexican case, which would allow for a more prudent use of the public budget, as well as the possibility of eradicating social inequality in the area of political participation. To do so, firstly, the main problems and limitations of public and private financing will be established when guaranteeing the free participation of citizens in voting and access to elected office; as well as the type of regime to which both forms of financing correspond and favor. Secondly, the reasons why mixed financing, here referred to as republican or liberal, is the most convenient for the Mexican political regime will be explored, as it allows guaranteeing what is stipulated in its constitutional principles of 1917 on a level of proportional equality. Finally, some parallel proposals will be introduced to strengthen the mixed financing principle.